Kreisel’s Theory of Constructions, the Kreisel-Goodman Paradox, and the Second Clause

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_3OpenAlexW2178450741MaRDI QIDQ5864196

Hidenori Kurokawa, Walter Dean

Publication date: 3 June 2022

Published in: Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_3

zbMATH Keywords

intuitionistic logiclogic of proofsBHK interpretationtheory of constructionsthe Kreisel-Goodman paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Structure of proofs (03F07) Proof theory in general (including proof-theoretic semantics) (03F03) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55)

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