Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

DOI10.1287/deca.2021.0425OpenAlexW3186936744MaRDI QIDQ5868920

Stephen Joe, Muhammad Ejaz, Chaitanya K. Joshi

Publication date: 26 September 2022

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2021.0425

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydecision theoryadversarial risk analysisfirst-price sealed-bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items

ADVERSARIAL RISK ANALYSIS FOR FIRST-PRICE SEALED-BID AUCTIONS ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Uncommon Knowledge in Multiparty Auctions

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