Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory
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Publication:5868929
DOI10.1287/deca.2021.0429OpenAlexW3167479073MaRDI QIDQ5868929
Timothy Murray, Ali Yekkehkhany, Rakesh Nagi
Publication date: 26 September 2022
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2021.0429
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