Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood Ratios

DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1192zbMath1498.91209arXiv2006.00481OpenAlexW4206548826MaRDI QIDQ5868939

Siddharth Barman, Nidhi Rathi

Publication date: 26 September 2022

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.00481

zbMATH Keywords

social welfarecake cuttingenvy-freenessNash social welfaremonotone likelihood ratio propertyegalitarian welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

Two's company, three's a crowd: consensus-halving for a constant number of agents

Cites Work

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• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
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• The Nash Social Welfare Function
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• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
• Algorithmic Solutions for Envy-Free Cake Cutting
• Contiguous Cake Cutting: Hardness Results and Approximation Algorithms
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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