Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
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Publication:5868957
DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1208zbMath1498.91101arXiv1905.00848OpenAlexW2949691923MaRDI QIDQ5868957
Pieter Kleer, Georgios Amanatidis, Guido Schäfer
Publication date: 26 September 2022
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00848
procurement auctionsnon-monotone submodular maximizationbudget-feasible mechanism designsubmodular knapsack secretary
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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