scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7651150
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Publication:5874477
DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2020.11MaRDI QIDQ5874477
Ranjani G. Sundaram, Anand Krishna, Umang Bhaskar, Siddharth Barman
Publication date: 7 February 2023
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.07370
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Related Items (7)
Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations ⋮ Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations ⋮ Fair and efficient allocation with few agent types, few item types, or small value levels ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions ⋮ Improved maximin guarantees for subadditive and fractionally subadditive fair allocation problem ⋮ A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness ⋮ Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
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