A multi-leader-follower game for energy demand-side management

DOI10.1080/02331934.2021.1954179OpenAlexW4281705165MaRDI QIDQ5880382

Sébastien Lepaul, Léonard von Niederhäusern, Didier Aussel

Publication date: 9 March 2023

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2021.1954179

zbMATH Keywords

bilevel optimizationdemand-side managementenergy markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical programming (90Cxx) Calculus of variations and optimal control; optimization (49-XX)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games
• Is bilevel programming a special case of a mathematical program with complementarity constraints?
• Foundations of bilevel programming
• A trilevel model for best response in energy demand-side management
• New Necessary Optimality Conditions for Bilevel Programs by Combining the MPEC and Value Function Approaches
• Solving multi-leader–common-follower games
• Computational Difficulties of Bilevel Linear Programming
• A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games
• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems

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