Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms

DOI10.1613/jair.1.13878OpenAlexW4317716367MaRDI QIDQ5881800

Xiaoxi Guo, Yongzhi Cao, Sujoy Sikdar, Hanpin Wang, Lirong Xia

Publication date: 13 March 2023

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08856

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymultiagent systemscomputational social systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

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