Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
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Publication:5881800
DOI10.1613/jair.1.13878OpenAlexW4317716367MaRDI QIDQ5881800
Xiaoxi Guo, Yongzhi Cao, Sujoy Sikdar, Hanpin Wang, Lirong Xia
Publication date: 13 March 2023
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08856
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