Evolution of cooperation under the coexistence of imitation and aspiration dynamics in structured populations
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Publication:5886444
DOI10.1088/1361-6544/acc500OpenAlexW4360962740MaRDI QIDQ5886444
Yuichi Tatsukawa, Jun Tanimoto, Md. Rajib Arefin
Publication date: 5 April 2023
Published in: Nonlinearity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6544/acc500
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