Who Wants a Good Reputation?
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Publication:5890343
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00175zbMath0980.91048OpenAlexW2157680720WikidataQ63347051 ScholiaQ63347051MaRDI QIDQ5890343
Larry Samuelson, George J. Mailath
Publication date: 14 October 2001
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00175
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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