Who Wants a Good Reputation?
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Publication:5890406
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00175zbMath0988.91026OpenAlexW2157680720WikidataQ63347051 ScholiaQ63347051MaRDI QIDQ5890406
Larry Samuelson, George J. Mailath
Publication date: 27 February 2002
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00175
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships ⋮ Public trust and government betrayal ⋮ A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired ⋮ Reputation building through costly adjustment ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Reputation from nested activities ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Sustainable reputations with rating systems ⋮ Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case ⋮ Reputation and liability in experience goods markets with imperfect monitoring ⋮ A dynamic model of certification and reputation
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