College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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Publication:5891148
DOI10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.05.386zbMath1272.91100DBLPjournals/tamm/GaleS13OpenAlexW4239749964WikidataQ58275900 ScholiaQ58275900MaRDI QIDQ5891148
Publication date: 4 September 2013
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.05.386
Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Collected or selected works; reprintings or translations of classics (01A75) Matching models (91B68)
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On (coalitional) exchange-stable matching ⋮ Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games ⋮ How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates ⋮ An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley “propose-and-reject” algorithm ⋮ A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Bipartite choices
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