Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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Publication:5891931
DOI10.1145/1132516.1132607zbMath1300.91033OpenAlexW2065980363MaRDI QIDQ5891931
Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Shahar Dobzinski
Publication date: 25 November 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp408.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Combinatorial games (91A46)
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