Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

proper equilibria Nash equilibrium P-stability incomplete information regular equilibria essential equilibria control costs f- approachability game in extensive form game in normal form perfect equilibria perturbation in the payoff functions perturbation in the strategy sets sequence of games sequential equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)

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