Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00481-1zbMath0875.90009OpenAlexW1985723560WikidataQ127976303 ScholiaQ127976303MaRDI QIDQ5894560

Tayfun Sönmez

Publication date: 27 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00481-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions ⋮ The division problem with voluntary participation ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies ⋮ The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

Cites Work

• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule