Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-70575-8_67zbMath1153.91436OpenAlexW1489333206MaRDI QIDQ5900245

Michael Schapira, Annamária Kovács, George Christodoulou

Publication date: 28 August 2008

Published in: Automata, Languages and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70575-8_67

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing ⋮ On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources ⋮ Principal-agent VCG contracts ⋮ On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms ⋮ On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets ⋮ Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy ⋮ Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions ⋮ Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions ⋮ Fair allocation of indivisible goods: beyond additive valuations ⋮ Pricing multi-unit markets ⋮ Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions ⋮ Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission ⋮ Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading ⋮ Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding ⋮ Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency ⋮ Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient ⋮ Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property ⋮ Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations ⋮ On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources ⋮ On the efficiency of all-pay mechanisms ⋮ Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions ⋮ Item bidding for combinatorial public projects ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions ⋮ Online pricing for multi-type of items ⋮ Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification ⋮ Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security ⋮ Economic efficiency requires interaction ⋮ Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions ⋮ Designing Cost-Sharing Methods for Bayesian Games ⋮ Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games ⋮ Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect