Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)90030-2zbMath0802.90020OpenAlexW1975770654MaRDI QIDQ5906549

Henrik Jensen

Publication date: 12 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)90030-2

zbMATH Keywords

credibilityinflation biasmonetary discretionmonetary policy games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (4)

Central bank independence and public debt policy ⋮ Note on `Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game' ⋮ Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited ⋮ Debt-contingent inflation contracts and targets

Cites Work

• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy
• DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY

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