On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)81902-7zbMath0911.90017MaRDI QIDQ5906924

Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceNash implementationMaskin-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

Cites Work

• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

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