Coreness of cooperative games with truncated submodular profit functions

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_6zbMath1415.91025arXiv1806.10833OpenAlexW2811165775MaRDI QIDQ5915546

Wei Chen, Xiaoming Sun, Xiaohan Shan, Jia-Lin Zhang

Publication date: 8 November 2018

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.10833

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamessubmodular functioncorecooperative gamesocial networkcorenesstruncated submodular profit functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• Optimal Inapproximability Results for MAX‐CUT and Other 2‐Variable CSPs?
• Understanding Machine Learning

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