Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
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Publication:5916382
DOI10.1007/BF01213663zbMath0858.90007OpenAlexW4239855816MaRDI QIDQ5916382
Publication date: 23 March 1997
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213663
Related Items (13)
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Cooperative production and efficiency ⋮ Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
Cites Work
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Incentives in Teams
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
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