Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

DOI10.1007/BF01213663zbMath0858.90007OpenAlexW4239855816MaRDI QIDQ5916382

Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 23 March 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213663

zbMATH Keywords

one private goodone public goodsemi-convex cost sharingminimum demand principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Cooperative production and efficiency ⋮ Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

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