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The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology - MaRDI portal

The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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Publication:5917582

DOI10.1016/S0022-0000(03)00044-8zbMath1072.68025OpenAlexW3000411098MaRDI QIDQ5917582

Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 18 November 2004

Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0000(03)00044-8




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