An incentive compatible, efficient market for air traffic flow management

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2018.09.006zbMath1436.91088arXiv1305.3241OpenAlexW2962810930WikidataQ129266016 ScholiaQ129266016MaRDI QIDQ5918109

Vijay V. Vazirani, Ruta Mehta

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.3241

zbMATH Keywords

market equilibriumair traffic flow managementmatching marketVCGincentive compatibleequilibrium allocationstrongly polynomial-time algorithmlanding slots

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Price of Fairness
• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

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