Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
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Publication:5918423
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-73879-2_7zbMath1482.90181arXiv2011.06763OpenAlexW3161465570MaRDI QIDQ5918423
Publication date: 21 December 2021
Published in: Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06763
Related Items (3)
Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ Stable allocations and partially ordered sets ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
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