Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-86772-0_24OpenAlexW3199718979MaRDI QIDQ5918697

Érik Martin-Dorel, Pierre Pomeret-Coquot, Hélène Fargier

Publication date: 15 June 2022

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86772-0_24

zbMATH Keywords

game theorybelief functionsincomplete games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)

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