Risk-free bidding in complement-free combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1007/s00224-021-10068-3zbMath1493.91059arXiv2111.14654OpenAlexW3215731962MaRDI QIDQ5918704

Adrian Vetta, Gautam Rayaprolu, Vishnu V. Narayan

Publication date: 21 June 2022

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.14654

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamecombinatorial auctionsrisk-freesequential auctionsimultaneous auctionrisk-free bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

The cross-entropy method for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions

Cites Work

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• The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
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• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• The declining price anomaly is not universal in multi-buyer sequential auctions (but almost is)
• Sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects

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