Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5919119
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.08.036OpenAlexW3039799833WikidataQ115036466 ScholiaQ115036466MaRDI QIDQ5919119
Lin Chen, Ahmed Sunny, Nolan Shah, Yang Lu, Weidong (Larry) Shi, Lei Xu, Shouhuai Xu, Zhi Min Gao
Publication date: 21 October 2021
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.02533
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- Approximation algorithms for a bi-level knapsack problem
- Frugal bribery in voting
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- NP-hardness of two edge cover generalizations with applications to control and bribery for approval voting
- Maximum bounded 3-dimensional matching is MAX SNP-complete
- Complete sets and the polynomial-time hierarchy
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Two-group knapsack game
- Improved approximation algorithms for a bilevel knapsack problem
- Large-Scale Election Campaigns: Combinatorial Shift Bribery
- A Study on the Computational Complexity of the Bilevel Knapsack Problem
- The complexity of computing the covering radius of a code
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- Swap Bribery
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
- Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy
- Control and Bribery in Voting
- Weighted Electoral Control
This page was built for publication: Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery
