Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids

DOI10.1007/s00453-020-00781-9OpenAlexW3104555763MaRDI QIDQ5925520

Piotr Sankowski, Gianpiero Monaco, Stefano Leonardi, Qiang Zhang

Publication date: 19 April 2021

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-020-00781-9

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designhereditary propertymatroid intersectionbudget feasible mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx) Graph theory (05Cxx)

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