Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
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Publication:5927694
DOI10.1007/PL00004103zbMath0984.91030MaRDI QIDQ5927694
Dominique Lepelley, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 26 April 2002
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (12)
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions ⋮ Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems ⋮ From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules ⋮ Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections? ⋮ Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
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