Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

zbMath1013.91026MaRDI QIDQ5928265

Colin F. Camerer, Christopher M. Anderson

Publication date: 6 July 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learningequilibrium refinementgame theory experimentssignaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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