Volunteers and pseudo-volunteers: The effect of recruitment method in dictator experiments

DOI10.1023/A:1026572918109zbMath0984.91507OpenAlexW4248452152MaRDI QIDQ5931146

Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman

Publication date: 7 May 2002

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1026572918109

zbMATH Keywords

charitable givingdictator gameexperimental methodology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Combinatorial games (91A46)

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