Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(99)00126-5zbMath1047.91015MaRDI QIDQ5931640

Takehiro Inohara, Bunpei Nakano, Akira Yamazaki

Publication date: 25 April 2001

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrycommitteespermission gamesrestricted permission gamesvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation ⋮ Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making ⋮ Equilibrium and efficiency in conflict analysis incorporating permissibility ⋮ A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation ⋮ A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity ⋮ Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation. ⋮ Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations

Cites Work

• The desirability relation of simple games
• Yes-no voting
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• On consistent coalitions in group decision making with flexible decision makers.
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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