Credibility of information in ``soft games with interperception of emotions.

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(99)00133-2zbMath1046.91004MaRDI QIDQ5931643

Takehiro Inohara, Bunpei Nakano, Shingo Takahashi

Publication date: 25 April 2001

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

completenessinformation exchangeinside commonalityinterperception

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (2)

Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making ⋮ Relational Nash equilibrium and interrelationships among relational and rational equilibrium concepts

Cites Work

• Solution concepts in hypergames
• Agreeing to disagree
• Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
• n-person ‘soft’ games
• Unnamed Item

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