Stability and largeness of the core

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0804zbMath1013.91012OpenAlexW2036163280MaRDI QIDQ5931924

Gomatam Ravindran, Amit K. Biswas, Thiruvenkatachari Parthasarathy

Publication date: 6 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0804

zbMATH Keywords

extendability conditionlarge corestable coreTU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Prosperty properties of TU-games
• Large cores and exactness
• Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games
• Core and monotonic allocation methods.
• STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION
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