A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00055-0zbMath0970.91050OpenAlexW2139639096MaRDI QIDQ5931982

Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo, Humberto Moreira

Publication date: 17 July 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(00)00055-0

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachgeneral Lagrangianmoral hazard problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (7)

An envelope approach to tournament design ⋮ On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ The informativeness principle without the first-order approach ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach

Cites Work

• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
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