The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00047-0zbMath0977.91014MaRDI QIDQ5932216

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 6 May 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Borda RuleCondorcet efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? ⋮ The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. ⋮ The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes ⋮ The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences ⋮ Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

Cites Work

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• The Borda dictionary
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting

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