Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00060-3zbMath0973.91021MaRDI QIDQ5932335

Somdeb Lahiri

Publication date: 3 July 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Oligarchic rulesplurality rulespecial choicevoting operators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Simple collective identity functions ⋮ Implementation of voting operators

Cites Work

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• Binariness and rational choice
• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions
• Majority functional operators in voting theory
• Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
• Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
• Impossibility results for choice correspondences
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination

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