A per model of secure information flow in sequential programs

DOI10.1023/A:1011553200337zbMath0967.68039OpenAlexW1519566437MaRDI QIDQ5936652

Andrei Sabelfeld, David Sands

Publication date: 3 July 2001

Published in: Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011553200337

zbMATH Keywords

securityconfidentialitynoninterferencepartial equivalence relationspowerdomainsprobabilistic covert channelssemantics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other programming paradigms (object-oriented, sequential, concurrent, automatic, etc.) (68N19) Abstract data types; algebraic specification (68Q65)

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