Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2722zbMath0982.91023OpenAlexW2067992055MaRDI QIDQ5937321

Eleftherios Zacharias, Steven R. Williams

Publication date: 1 April 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2722

zbMATH Keywords

market modelsbargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Customer poaching and coupon trading ⋮ Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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