Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2695zbMath1103.91321OpenAlexW4246612327MaRDI QIDQ5938635

Harold L. Cole, Narayana R. Kocherlakota

Publication date: 23 October 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.254

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (11)

A strategic dynamic programming method for studying short-memory equilibria of stochastic games with uncountable number of states ⋮ Discontinuous stochastic games ⋮ Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games ⋮ Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Analysis of a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model with Asymptotic Efficiency ⋮ Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ Value functions for depth-limited solving in zero-sum imperfect-information games ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information ⋮ Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions ⋮ Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game

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• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation

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