A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections

DOI10.1016/S0893-9659(00)00154-3zbMath0987.91020OpenAlexW1964357175MaRDI QIDQ5938920

William H. E. Day, Fred R. McMorris, Hans-Hermann Bock

Publication date: 7 August 2001

Published in: Applied Mathematics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0893-9659(00)00154-3

zbMATH Keywords

committee electionsconsensus rulesextreme neutralityminimal eligibilityvote concentration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.

Cites Work

• Consensus rules for committee elections
• On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
• Attainable results in committee elections.
• The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences

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