On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90024-8zbMath0525.90066OpenAlexW2003339833MaRDI QIDQ593980

Georges Bordes

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90024-8

zbMATH Keywords

choice consistency conditionsgeneral Pareto conditionstrictly majoritarian social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special problems of linear programming (transportation, multi-index, data envelopment analysis, etc.) (90C08)

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