Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

DOI10.1007/PL00004116zbMath0979.91063OpenAlexW2086722131MaRDI QIDQ5940582

Claude Fluet, Dominique Demougin

Publication date: 9 August 2001

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004116

zbMATH Keywords

information systemsmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

The effect of better information on income inequality ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Ranking of signals in multitask agency models ⋮ Information in tournaments under limited liability ⋮ Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments ⋮ Standards of proof and civil litigation: a game-theoretic analysis

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