Mechanism design in queueing problems
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Publication:5940592
DOI10.1007/PL00004107zbMath0989.90035OpenAlexW2026467685MaRDI QIDQ5940592
Publication date: 9 August 2001
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004107
Related Items (35)
Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem ⋮ A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss ⋮ Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Egalitarianism in the queueing problem ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling ⋮ Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem ⋮ Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness ⋮ Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems ⋮ When queueing is better than push and shove ⋮ Group strategyproofness in queueing models ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems ⋮ A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem ⋮ No-envy in queueing problems ⋮ A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem ⋮ An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
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