Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

DOI10.1007/PL00004123zbMath1016.91028MaRDI QIDQ5940598

Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 9 August 2001

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

separabilityPareto efficiencynon-bossinesspopulation-monotonictystrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (7)

Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible ⋮ Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Population monotonicity in fair division of multiple indivisible goods ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

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