On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2zbMath0981.91020WikidataQ127797641 ScholiaQ127797641MaRDI QIDQ5940738

No author found.

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

FCC auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• An optimal auction for complements
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Sequential auctions with synergies: An example
• A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

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