Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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Publication:5940810
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00362-1zbMath1005.91085OpenAlexW2136523711WikidataQ56212386 ScholiaQ56212386MaRDI QIDQ5940810
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Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00362-1
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Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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