Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00067-1zbMath0978.91500MaRDI QIDQ5940869

M. Utku Ünver

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitygenetic algorithmlabor marketsmatching game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study ⋮ Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems ⋮ What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ Exploding offers and unraveling in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation ⋮ The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation

Uses Software

• Genocop

Cites Work

• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Auctions with artificial adaptive agents
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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