Marginal costs and collusive sustainability

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00409-8zbMath0994.91015OpenAlexW2071048401MaRDI QIDQ5941129

No author found.

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00409-8

zbMATH Keywords

mark-uppositive price constraintrepeated marketsubgame perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames