Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game
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Publication:5941341
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00014-2zbMath0981.91008OpenAlexW2081963064MaRDI QIDQ5941341
Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00014-2
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cites Work
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