Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00057-3zbMath0981.91075OpenAlexW3123084888MaRDI QIDQ5941342

Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00057-3

zbMATH Keywords

growth ratepolitical authoritypublic servicesrent-seeking bureaucracies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

Corruption, mortality rates, and development: policies for escaping from the poverty trap

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Bureaucracy, investment, and growth
• Productive government expenditures and long-run growth
• Public investment in infrastructure in a simple growth model

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